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ANTHROPOCENE, CAPITALOCENE, MACHINOCENE: 
ILLUSIONS OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON
ABSTRACT
In their seminal work, Dialectics of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno 
interpreted capitalism as the irrational monetization of nature. In the 
present work, I analyze three 21st century concepts, Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene and Machinocene, in light of Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
arguments and recent arguments from the philosophy of biology. The 
analysis reveals a remarkable prescience of the term “instrumental reason”, 
which is present in each of the three concepts in a profound and cryptic 
way. In my interpretation, the term describes the propensity of science 
based on the notion of physicalism to interpret nature as the machine 
analyzable and programmable by the human reason. As a result, the 
Anthropocene concept is built around the mechanicist model, which may 
be presented as the metaphor of the car without brakes. In a similar 
fashion, the Machinocene concept predicts the emergence of the mechanical 
mind, which will dominate nature in the near future. Finally, the Capitalocene 
concept turns a perfectly rational ambition to expand knowledge into 
an irrational obsession with over-knowledge, by employing the 
institutionalized science as the engine of capitalism without brakes. The 
common denominator of all three concepts is the irrational propensity 
to legitimize self-destruction. Potential avenues for countering the effects 
of “instrumental reason” are suggested.
The melancholy science from which I make this offering to my 
friend relates to a region that from time immemorial was re-
garded as the true field of philosophy, but which, since the lat-
ter’s conversion into method, has lapsed into intellectual neglect, 
sententious whimsy and finally oblivion: the teaching of the good 
life… Our perspective of life has passed into an ideology which 
conceals the fact that there is life no longer. (Adorno 2005: 15)
1. Introduction
Is it possible to analyze capitalism in light of biology? Provided that the question 
is understood as a philosophical question, a positive answer to it is identifiable 
in the works of the first generation philosophers of the Frankfurt School. In Dia-
lectics of Enlightenment (DE) Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno interpreted 
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capitalism as an irrational monetization of nature (Horkheimer and Adorno 
2002). Here is a metaphor, which explains the relationship between capitalism 
and nature in the manner close to the Adorno-Horkheimer style of thinking.
Let us imagine that capitalism represents a form of a car. The driver of the 
car is the entire humanity via its socio-economic activity (Hawken et al. 1999; 
Soete et al. 2015; Schwab 2016). The car has the functioning engine and the 
functioning mechanism for speed enhancement controlled by the gas pedal. 
However, the car differs from standard car models in that it lacks the brake. It 
is not programmed to stop, slow down or reverse back because the econom-
ic recession is not computed in the car model. Instead, the car is modeled on 
the assumption that the global economy must grow – the pressure on the gas 
pedal is constant. If, for some reason, the car enters the unfavorable territo-
ry such as an uphill path, which leads to it slowing down (recession), the car 
is programmed to immediately search for solutions as to how to avoid such a 
path and return to the state of acceleration again (Soete et al. 2015).
In the language of cybernetics, the car without brakes as a metaphor for cap-
italism means that modern humanity constantly self-enhances positive feed-
back. All natural systems are exposed to two types of regulatory pressure. One 
type of pressure is the positive feedback loop (Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28) – 
the accelerating car metaphor. The alternative type of pressure is the negative 
feedback loop (Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28) – the brake metaphor. Constant 
balancing of positive and negative feedbacks, acceleration and brake, is the 
source of natural systems’ stability or homeostasis.
The sources of positive feedback in natural systems such as plant or animal 
populations, for example, are their capacities to multiply through sexual repro-
duction and to maintain the scale of population growth through exploiting nu-
tritional and other resources available in the ecosystem (De Angelis et al. 1986: 
5–14, Schoener 2011). The sources of negative feedback include their natural 
predators, lack of nutritional and other resources in the ecosystem, various 
diseases and ecological catastrophes (De Angelis et al. 1986: 5–14, Schoener 
2011). The biosphere itself is the super-system which (i) integrates numerous 
sub-systems produced by 9 million extant biological species1 (Mora et al. 2011) 
and (ii) maintains its own homeostasis (Lovelock and Margulis 1974).
Modern humanity, as a natural system, defeated all predators, eradicat-
ed all major infectious diseases and invented technologies for the ecosystem 
alteration, thus eliminating important natural sources of negative feedback 
(Bateson 2000, Schwab 2016). This enabled capitalism, as the dominant hu-
man socio-economic form, to become the conquest of nature (Hawken et al. 
1999, Moore 2017, 2018). Nature is seen as an unlimited source of cheap capital. 
The only requirement is the identification of the means by which the capital 
1  Estimates of the species number vary. The most recent one (Larsen et al. 2017) sug-
gests that the total number of species is 1-6 billion, with the 70%-90% of the species 
range representing bacteria. The estimate by Mora et al. 2011 excludes microbes (bac-
teria and archaea).
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hidden in nature can be released. In the conquering attempt of this sort, any 
form of brake becomes an obstacle. 
Given that a reliance on the positive feedback generates an enormous risk 
to the system as a whole (De Angelis et al. 1986: 5-14, Bateson 2000: 486–496, 
Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28), humanity must discover a form of a negative feed-
back loop. The self-imposed negative feedback loop could enable stabilization 
of the damaged ecosystem. In other words, without the functioning brake, the 
accelerating car is doomed to a crash, sooner or later, because the super-system 
eventually punishes the lack of negative feedback (Bateson 2000: 486–496, De 
Angleis et al. 1986: 5–14, Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28). Modern humanity has 
already entered the ecological disaster of its own making, known as the sixth 
mass extinction of species (Ceballos et al. 2015) or biological “annihilation” 
(Ceballos et al. 2017) which reduces biodiversity required for the long-term 
survival. Other manifestations of existential risks due to the lack of negative 
feedback include climate change, potential loss of control over technologies 
and vulnerabilities of human systemic technologies to external insults (Rees 
2003). Thus, the invention of the brake on the imaginary car of capitalism be-
comes a necessary civilizational requirement.
In this paper I will argue that the greatest contribution of the Critical Theory 
of Frankfurt School, primarily Adorno and Horkheimer, to the modern phil-
osophical, sociological and scientific discourses is demonstration, in an indi-
rect way, that the invention of the brake on the accelerating car of capitalism 
constitutes an anti-barbaric act and thus a necessary civilizational advance, or 
more precisely an antidote against self-destruction. I will use the concept of 
Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000, Lewis and Maslin 2015: 171) and 
its more recent derivatives, Capitalocene (Moore 2017: 597; Moore 2018: 2) and 
Machinocene (Price 2016), as the ground for analysis. In the next section, I will 
outline the investigative platform on which this study is based and explain ter-
minology. In subsequent sections, I will develop new analytics of modernity 
based on several recent developments in biological sciences.
2. Investigative Context and Definitions of Terms
The purpose of this section is to (i) outline the investigative framework on 
which this study is based and (ii) explain terms Anthropocene, Capitalocene 
and Machinocene. The main text that forms the investigative basis of the study 
is DE, first published in 1944. The concepts of Anthropocene, Capitalocene, 
and Machinocene, all invented in the 21st century, are predictable in principle, 
by the argumentation expressed in DE. 
The starting point in constructing the investigative framework is the expo-
sure of the accelerating car of capitalism metaphor (ACM in the rest of text) to 
the spirit of DE arguments, with a view to merging them together. One of the 
key concepts of DE is “instrumental reason” explicable by the criticism of the 
foundation of science. Scientific world-view, which dominates western civiliza-
tion since Enlightenment, is based on the mechanistic understanding of nature. 
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In Galileo’s mathematization of nature, nature itself is idealized on the model 
of the new mathematics… Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic pro-
cess, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced 
by the machine. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 19).
Interpretation of nature as a mechanical system, the machine, can only be 
invented by a form of reason that becomes irrational – “instrumental reason”.
ACM reflects mechanicism that permeates the scientific world-view domi-
nated by physicalism (Barbieri 2016: 2). In brief, physicalism is the notion that 
all sciences are reducible to the mechanics of physics (Wächtershäuser 1997, 
Stoljar 2017). (I will argue later that nature cannot be reduced to mechanistic 
arguments of physicalism; see the Machinocene section). The shiny and fast car, 
which we drive, is a mechanical invention par excellence, with all attributes of 
progressivism. The fuel for the car is science and technology, also recognized 
by the acronym R&D (research and development) – the humanity’s collective 
laboratory, turned-fuelling-station, which interprets the entire nature as the 
source for fuel extraction (Hawken et al. 1999, Soete et al. 2015, Moore 2017, 
Moore 2018). Everything seems perfectly rational in this laboratory. An army 
of 7.8 million scientists producing 1.5 million research papers and millions of 
patents per annum works on generating the fuel for the car in the most inge-
nious ways by applying powerful inventions based on the scientific method 
(Soete et al. 2015: 14–18).
However, the irrationality of the dominant scientific world-view manifests 
as the inability to see (blindness) that a car without brakes is doomed to a crash. 
There are enough signs to recognize that the car has already started colliding 
with its natural habitat. One of the signs is a recently reported phenomenon 
of “biological annihilation”, which may damage the biosphere irreversibly 
(Ceballos et al. 2017: E6089). However, there is no mechanism on the car or 
within the car, which can detect the crash, the same way the mechanism for 
braking is non-existent. As a result, the global scientific laboratory-turned-fu-
eling-station, continues to work unabated. The option of stopping the car to 
assess damage to itself and its habitat is not available. Instead, humanity con-
tinues to accelerate the car by using ever more powerful types of fuel leading 
to ever greater damage–a clear sign of irrationalism of “instrumental reason”. 
The ACM model is further rationalized by suggesting that there is no need for 
inventing brakes (Hawken et al. 1999: 1–21). Instead, nature should undergo 
voluntary enslavement to capitalism by opening its avenues long enough and 
wide enough, so that the need for the brake on ACM is eliminated.2
2  This is the key message of the influential book (Hawken et al. 1999: 4). The authors 
identify four forms of capital: human, financial, manufactured and natural. The first 
three forms of capital use the fourth form (natural capital or the entire nature) as the 
material for creating “cars, highways, cities, bridges, houses, food, medicine, hospital 
and schools.” The estimated value of the natural capital is $ 400 – 500 trillion in total, 
or $ 30 trillion annually (the equivalent of the world economic output).
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The merger of ACM and the spirit of DE arguments thus represent the in-
vestigative framework summarized in Table 1. The merger is formally facilitat-
ed by selecting relevant quotes from DE and pairing them with the rationalist 
and irrationalist components of ACM outlined above (Table 1). This framework 
will serve as the basis for analysis in subsequent sections of the article. Before 
starting the analysis it is important to define the terms Anthropocene, Capi-
talocene and Machinocene.
Table 1. The investigative framework of the study constructed by combining relevant 
quotes from DE and the ACM metaphor discussed in the text. 
DE ACM
Argument for 
rationalism
Enlightenment, understood in 
the widest sense as the advance 
of thought, has always aimed at 
liberating human beings from fear 
and installing them as masters. 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 1)
Human technological progress 
is deceptively rational: a 
perfect mechanism for 
enhancing positive feedback.
Argument for 
irrationalism
Yet the wholly enlightened 
earth is radiant with triumphant 
calamity. (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 2002: 1)
Human technological progress 
is hopelessly irrational: it lacks 
negative feedback required for 
balancing its potentially deadly 
over-drive.
All three terms express, each in its own way, forces of domination which 
humanity is trying to exert over nature. The term Anthropocene, coined by 
a Nobel Prize winning chemist, Paul Crutzen, and his colleague Eugene Sto-
ermer (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000) is summarized by the following quote:
…humanity replaced nature as the dominant environmental force on Earth (Ru-
dimman et al. 2015: 38). 
This message, in the context of the scientific world-view, is the logical 
consequence of the growth of scientific knowledge governed by physicalism.
Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits either in its enslavement of cre-
ation or its deference to worldly masters. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 2)
However, the physicalist message was countered long before the term An-
thropocene was invented: 
What human beings learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both 
it and human beings. …Only thought which does violence to itself is hard enough 
to shatter myths. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 2)
Thus, DE reminds us that the roots of the Anthropocene concept are in “in-
strumental reason” but not in science. The origins of “instrumental reason” 
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precede science and can be traced to the territory of human culture we call 
mythology. Given that mythology is an ever-present part of human culture, at 
least since the origin of languages, the inevitable conclusion is that roots of 
“instrumental reason” may be in the human nature, as argued by biologist Ed-
ward O. Wilson (Wilson 2012:56). Science is nothing but a tool in hands of “in-
strumental reason” which becomes the victim of mythologization (see below).
The Capitalocene concept is a recent variation on the Anthropocene theme 
developed by Jason M. Moore (Moore 2017; Moore 2018). It represents a pow-
erful criticism of the Anthropocene concept. Its critique is focused on how An-
thropocene misinterprets its historical and philosophical roots. The key argu-
ment is that the Anthropocene concept represents a product of philosophical 
reductionism based on the Cartesian split. The Cartesian split turned humanity 
into an independent subject and nature into a passive object. This gave a license 
to the subject to dominate the object. However, humanity and its institutions 
are an integral part of nature. Moore used the phrases “humanity-in-nature” 
and “nature-in-humanity” to contrast the Cartesian stance of humanity and 
nature as separate and independent entities. Thus, Moore defines capitalism 
as the global ecology, which combines the quest for power and coproduction 
with nature into an organic whole. Whether this organic whole has any long-
term future is a different matter. 
The value of the Capitalocene concept is in highlighting important omissions 
that make Anthropocene almost untenable in the context of new developments 
in foundations of biology (see below). Also, it helps refine the ACM model. 
Even though the car is driven by the entire humanity through the acceptance 
of international regulations for the global capitalist economy (world-ecology) 
the ACM model itself is (i) invented by the minority and (ii) imposed by the 
minority on the majority without any explicit approval. Such approval was not 
required simply because at the time of the origin of the model (Europe around 
1450 according to Moore) institutions for approval did not exist. This poses 
an important question of whether the imposition without approval is part of 
“nature-in-humanity”. 
The term Machinocene, used in a recent essay (Price 2016) expresses the 
view that AI (Artificial Intelligence) will dominate nature in a not so distant 
future (the end of the 21st century). The expectation is that some form of ma-
chine superintelligence may become autonomous and supersede human intel-
ligence (Bostrom 2014). The Antropocene as the force dominating nature will 
be replaced by the mechanical mind of Machinocene. This view is based on 
the mechanistic understanding of nature and as such, it represents a powerful 
expression of “instrumental reason”.
3. Analysis
Developments in biological sciences in the last several decades suggest that 
biology may not be fully reducible to physics (Bateson 1979, 2000; Rosen 1991, 
Capra 1997; Elsasser 1998; Maturana and Varela 1998; Kineman 2011; Slijepcevic 
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2018a). This is not to say that laws of physics are not applicable to biological 
systems; or that biological systems do not obey the laws of physics. Instead, it 
may be possible that the behavior of living organisms is not reducible to phys-
icochemical causality. Here is an argument put forward by a mathematician 
and theoretical biologist Robert Rosen (Rosen 1991: 13):
Why could it not be that the “universals” of physics are only so on a small and 
special (if inordinately prominent) class of material systems, a class to which 
organisms are too general to belong? What if physics is the particular, and bi-
ology the general, instead of the other way around? If this is so, then nothing 
in contemporary science will remain the same.
Some of the relevant developments in the biological sciences, which con-
stitute a powerful argument against physicalism, and support the framework 
outlined in Table 1, will be explored in detail. Given that the physicalist out-
look is at the heart of the Anthropocene and Machinocene concepts, I will 
next outline a critique of these concepts based on the Table 1 framework. The 
Capitalocene concept, which is closer to the DE style argumentation, will be 
refined in light of the framework. 
3.1 Criticism of the Anthropocene Concept
3.1.1 Mythologization of Science or How to Justify the Progressivism of ACM
According to Walter Elsasser, we live in the post-rationalist world. His analy-
sis of Enlightenment parallels DE:
The period of Rationalism, in its early phases usually called the “Enlighten-
ment,” began, roughly, around 1600 and lasted nearly 350 years, its last ripples 
being rather rudely terminated by history, through two world wars and, at the 
end of the second, by the knowledge then acquired of nuclear reactions which 
makes possible a sudden catastrophic termination of men’s activities. Nothing 
less “rational” can readily be thought of. (Elsasser 1998: 127)
How can irrationalism of Enlightenment and its product, science, be justi-
fied? The answer of Horkheimer and Adorno was powerful. Irrationalism can 
only be justified by resorting to mythology:
Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything un-
known. This has determined the path of demythologization … Enlightenment 
is mythical fear radicalized. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 11).
ACM reflects a belief that humanity will conquer the territory of the un-
known and therefore free itself from fear. The means for conquest is science 
based on the notion of physicalism. It is widely accepted by the scientific com-
munity that all sciences are reducible to physics. This view is best summarized 
by a Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist and the intellectual force behind 
the Human Genome Project, James Watson:
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There is only one science, physics. The rest is social work (cited in Rose 2005: 83).
The pro-physicalist attitude of modern science is further expressed by the 
title of a popular book, What Remains to Be Discovered, by a former editor of 
the leading science journal, Nature (Maddox 1999). The assumption on which 
the book is based is that nature represents a mechanical system. The logic of 
any mechanical system suggests that the number of steps required to fully un-
derstand it is finite and achievable by the human reason.
Similarly, modern physics assumes that a scientific theory integrating all 
physical forces is achievable. Speculation about this theory, known as “Theo-
ry of everything” (Barrow 2007), found its way into the Hollywood mytholo-
gy through an eponymous movie. Thus, science in the form of physicalism is 
being mythologized. 
The origin of mythologization of science can be traced to the aphorism usu-
ally attributed to the father of physicalism, Sir Isaac Newton:
If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants (Merton 1993: 1).
We can find the most recent attribution of the aphorism to Newton in the 
title of an eponymous book, which identified five giants of science: Coperni-
cus, Galilei, Newton himself, Kepler and Einstein (Hawking 2003). However, 
 according to Robert K. Merton, it seems that the Enlightenment’s memory stops 
with Copernicus, Galilei, Kepler, and Newton. In his book, On the Shoulders 
of Giants, also known by the acronym OTSOG, Merton powerfully argued that 
the aphorism precedes science and Enlightenment and it is wrongly attributed 
to Newton by his followers (Merton 1993: 8–11). This discrepancy exposed by 
Merton indirectly agrees with the DE notion of mythologization of science. 
By adopting the OTSOG aphorism attributable to the father of physicalism, 
and by ignoring thinkers who used the aphorism long before Newton, science 
has been mythologizing physicalism since its beginnings (Cunningham and 
Williams 1993: 427).
The view of nature as a mechanical system, which can be conquered by 
human knowledge, as well as the notion of OTSOG, are challenged by a bio-
logical theory known as evolutionary epistemology (EE). EE is a programme 
of research in biology and philosophy of science based on three principles: (i) 
living systems are knowledge systems, (ii) evolution is the process of gaining 
knowledge, and (iii) there are features shared by all forms of knowledge gain 
(Plotkin, 1982: 3–13; Bradie 1986: 404, Slijepcevic 2018a: 24). The nature-wide 
quest for knowledge is practiced by all living systems, from bacteria to humans 
(Slijepcevic 2018a: 26). One of the proponents of EE was Karl Popper who 
memorably argued that there is little difference between Einstein and amoe-
ba in their quests for knowledge (Popper 1979: 24–25). Similarly, Robin Dun-
bar likened science to natural hypothesis testing: all organisms are engaged 
in testing different possibilities, or natural hypotheses, based on their under-
standing of local environments (Dunbar 1996: 75).
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The natural quest for knowledge has its own hierarchy (Figure 1; see also 
Slijepcevic 2018a). The founders of the knowledge-seeking quest are first liv-
ing organisms –bacteria. Thus, Bacteriocene must have the primacy over An-
thropocene (Figure 1). By the same logic Florocene (or Plantocene) and Insec-
tocene, which emerged long before Anthropocene, must have primacy over it 
(Figure 1). Thus, the process of life is an epistemological process – epistemol-
ogy naturalized according to Quine (1969) – coupled with its ontological coun-
terpart into an epistemological-ontological unity (Plotkin 1982: 3–13; Bradie 
1986: 404). Humanity is a late actor in the knowledge-seeking theatre of evo-
lution. We are present in this theater, not as the main character, but rather as 
a background actor or an extra. If the entire process of biological evolution is 
condensed into an imaginary play or a movie, we only appear at its end, vir-
tually in the last second.
Bacteriocene 
Florocene 
Insectocene 
Anthropocene 
Capitalocene 
Machinocene 
Figure 1. A nested evolutionary hierarchy of organisms capable of altering the environment (the 
suffix “cene” is used as in Anthropocene). Capitalocene and Machinocene are derivatives.
The fallacy of the Anthropocene concept, according to which humanity dom-
inates nature, is exposed through the term Cyanocene (Sagan 2017). This term 
reflects the fact that photosynthetic cyanobacteria radically altered the Earth’s 
atmosphere, by polluting it with oxygen, three billion years before all animals 
and plants emerged in the evolution. How can humanity (the Anthropocene) 
dominate nature when it depends on the ecological waste created by Cyanocene?
It is now clear that bacteria possess intelligence, which some philosophers 
call “bacterial cognitive tool-kit” (Lyon 2015: 4; Lyon 2017: 444–445). Fur-
thermore, our quest for knowledge is dependent on bacteria. For example, our 
bodies, and the bodies of all plants and animals have accompanying popula-
tions of bacteria, which outnumber human cells 10 to 1. These conglomerates 
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of bacteria, known as microbiota, turn our bodies into complex ecological sys-
tems consisting of 37 trillion human cells (themselves formed by bacteria and 
archaea) and 400 trillion bacterial cells. The scientific name for meta-organisms 
(all plants and animals) is holobionts – ecological communities of bacteria and 
their hosts (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008: 723). An integral part of 
this ecological relationship is the microbiota-gut-brain axis (Smith 2015: 314). 
Bacteria present in our gut drive intestinal cells to produce the neurotransmit-
ter serotonin, which then circulates in the blood (Smith 2015: 314). This leads 
to altruistic behavior of the host, which benefits bacteria long-term, indicat-
ing that the ecological relationships within the holobiont proper, and effects 
of this relationship on the ecosystem, are complex (Levin-Epstein et al. 2017).
Thus, if the concept of Anthropocene is to be taken seriously it must ac-
knowledge that it is standing on the shoulders of Bacteriocene and Florocene. 
As a matter of fact, the entire biosphere is standing on the shoulders of “in-
visible dwarfs”– bacteria (Figure 1). The OTSOG thus becomes OTSOID (On 
the Shoulders of Invisible Dwarfs).
The OTSOID shatters the concept of Anthropocene by challenging the no-
tion of physicalism in a major way. Nature is not a mechanical system because 
we live in an environment dominated by living systems invisible to our eyes. 
Bacteria are the founders of, and the main player in the planetary biosphere 
(Margulis and Sagan 1997). The biomass of bacteria exceeds the human bio-
mass (Whitman et al. 1998, Kallmeyer et al. 2012). Given that our environment 
is biological and it consists of living systems (Okasha 2005), we will never be 
able to conquer it (Ben-Jacob 1998). The reason for this is that living systems 
are not mechanical systems, which are exhaustible by physicalist knowledge. 
Gregory Bateson argued that living systems are indeterministic and aesthet-
ic systems, resistant to the conquest by mechanistic science (Bateson 1979; 
2000). He famously likened nature to a giant mind beyond our reach. Bateson 
thought that our propensity for the ecological violence is the consequence of 
the epistemological error committed by the Western civilization – domination 
of mechanistic or physicalist epistemology. 
Walter Elsasser openly challenged physicalism. Elsasser coined the term “bio-
tonic laws” to highlight the notion that the behavior of living systems cannot be 
reduced to physicochemical causality (Elsasser 1958; Elsasser 1998). The school 
of theoretical biology known as relational biology provides detailed argumenta-
tion in support of this thesis (see the section on Machinocene). The key message 
of relational biology is that living systems may not be computable (Rosen 1991; 
Elsasser 1998). In other words, living systems are beyond physicalist science.
3.1.2. The Motivation for Building the Car
The previous section outlined arguments for mythologization of science. It is 
worth repeating that the roots of mythologization of science may be in human 
nature (Wilson 2012), rather than in science itself. Mythologization of science 
is partly responsible for justification to build the car without brakes (ACM) 
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 553
driven by the entire humanity or the Anthropocene. The aim of this section 
is to outline the key motive for building the car. This motive, again, may be 
part of our biology. 
Homo sapiens belong to a rare group of species practicing the highest form 
of social behavior known as eusociality (Wilson 2012). Other practitioners of 
eusociality are rare species of social insects: ants, termites, and bees (Crespi 
and Yanega 1995, Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). The consequence of eusocial 
behavior is the emergence of the social collective termed the superorganism in 
the case of ants, termites, and bees (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). The equiv-
alents of the human superorganism are modern states (Gowdy and Krall 2013). 
In the social structures of modern states individual freedom is formatted by 
the function of the collective: 
The power of all the members of society, to whom as individuals no other way is 
open, is constantly summated, through the division of labor imposed on them, 
in the realization of the whole, whose rationality is thereby multiplied over 
again. What is done to all by the few always takes the form of the subduing of 
individuals by the many: the oppression of society always bears the features of 
oppression by a collective. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 16)
Let us search for an explanation of the phrase oppression by a collective with-
in the phenomenon of eusociality. Eusociality is recognized by three features: 
(i) several generations within the social group, (ii) care for the young and (iii) 
division of labor including reproductive labor (Crespi and Yanega 1995;  Wilson 
and Hölldobler 2005). In eusocial insects, the above three features of eusoci-
ality are easily identifiable (Crespi and Yanega 1995; Wilson and Hölldobler 
2005). By contrast, one aspect of the third feature, namely the division of re-
productive labor, may not be present in human societies leading some scien-
tists to dispute the notion of human eusociality. 
For example, ant and bee workers are sterile. The only reproductive worker 
in their societies is the queen. In human societies, all members are fertile from 
puberty to middle ages. However, women lose fertility not because of ageing 
but in a biologically programmed fashion known as the menopause. Research 
shows that the function of the menopause, also known as grandmother effect, 
is to help inexperienced daughters raise the young. Thus, the menopause in 
women may represent a form of reproductive division of labour in human so-
cieties (Foster and Ratnieks 2005). Other forms of reproductive division of la-
bour in modern societies may be the surrogate motherhood (Teman 2008) and 
same-sex marriages, which require either the surrogate motherhood or special-
ized reproductive technology for raising a family (Eskridge 1993). According 
to Edward O. Wilson, Homo sapiens is a truly eusocial species (Wilson 2012).
Therefore, what Horkheimer and Adorno termed realization of the whole 
may represent the emergence of the human superorganism – the modern state 
governed by the physicalist science (Gowdy and Krall 2013; Soete et al. 2015; 
see also next section). In a further leap of social integration, states form unions 
(e.g. EU – European Union; ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations; 
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UNASUR or Union of South American Nations etc.), which eventually form the 
global socio-economic union (Soete et al. 2015). The new global union cannot 
function without the international monetary system. Thus, ACM is regulated 
by a set of internationally approved norms (Soete et al. 2015). 
A key question becomes how the human superorganism exerts the function 
of subduing of individuals or oppression of a collective. Is the oppression of an 
individual by a collective a necessary biological manifestation of eusociality? 
A neurobiologist Thomas D. Seeley argued in his book, Honeybee Democracy, 
that this is not the case (Seeley 2010: 218–231). He presented arguments that 
honeybee societies practice a form of eusocial behavior, which prevents dom-
ination of the collective over individuals by allowing each individual worker 
to participate in the collective decision-making. For example, the influence 
of the queen as the elite individual is completely suppressed. To demonstrate 
her value to the collective the queen emits certain pheromones, which are 
constantly monitored by workers. Once the workers sense that the quality of 
the signal emitted by the queen is not worthy to the society as a whole, they 
simply replace the queen in the process of swarming. A large group of honey-
bee workers splits from the superorganism, raises the new queen by feeding a 
worker by the queen jelly and collectively searches for the suitable territory for 
a newly emerging superorganism. Decision-making in the process of the terri-
tory search is truly democratic. The group sends hundreds of scouts to identify 
the most suitable natural habitat for the new superoroganism. Each scout re-
ports back her findings to the collective. The decision is made through a com-
plex process of debating each find and assessing its merit for the collective.
The honeybee democracy is based on three principles: (i) all members of 
the superorganism show mutual respect and have united interests which ex-
clude domination of the queen over the collective, (ii) the “thinking” of the 
society is a truly collective thinking which identifies multiple solutions to 
any given problem faced by the society, and (iii) the collective wisdom of the 
society identifies the best solution which is in the interest of all members of 
the society. It is important to stress that social insects are not automata lack-
ing individuality. Recent research suggests that eusocial insects possess indi-
viduality and yet remain part of the eusocial collective (Robinson et al. 2014, 
O’Shea-Wheller et al. 2017).
The way in which modern human superorganisms, or states, practice de-
mocracy is in disparity with the principles of the honeybee democracy. First, 
the elites, who control the capital show little respect towards other members 
of society suggesting a disparity of interests (Klein 2007). Second, there is no 
truly collective thinking, which is in the interest of all members of the society. 
For example, the decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 was not in the in-
terest of all American citizens, but only in the interest of the elite (Seeley 2010: 
223). Third, in societies in which there is a disparity of interests, there can be 
no collective wisdom (Klein 2007).
Differences in principles of eusocial democracy practiced by modern hu-
man states, relative to honeybee superorganisms, may be a consequence of the 
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dominant “instrumental reason”  in the case of humans (Table 1). It is clear from 
previous arguments that “instrumental reason” may be involved in preparing 
the ground for the emergence of the ACM socio-economic model practiced by 
the entire humanity. But this model was imposed on the human collective by 
a small group of its influential members for their own interest (see the Capita-
locene section). This small group, the few, then orchestrated the distribution 
of responsibility on the entire collective. This is reflected in the Anthropocene 
concept – the entire humanity, or Anthropos, is willingly behind the imagi-
nary dashboard in our accelerating car (ACM). The manipulatory triumph of 
the few is hidden in the collective pride – the Age of Man – trumpeted from 
the pages of leading scientific journals (Monastersky 2015). 
Interestingly, there is evidence that eusocial insects are naturally protected 
against the practice of “instrumental reason” as a form of natural epistemol-
ogy. In other words, they possess the brakes on their equivalent of the car – 
they may be naturally programmed to avoid the ACM-type models. Eusocial 
ants made a social conquest of Earth millions of years before humanity (Wil-
son 2012). Their global superorganism, which may appropriately be called the 
Insectocene, can generate enough ecological pressure to seriously damage the 
environment. For example, leafcutter ants, from the genera Atta and Acromyr-
mex, harvest fresh leaves from South American forests on the large scale and 
thus create the ecological pressure (Costa et al. 2008). However, they seem to 
“know” when to stop cutting leaves to allow trees to recover (Hölldobler and 
Wilson 1990: 623, Strassen 2018) and by doing so avoid serious damage to their 
natural habitat. Recall the imaginary theater of evolution, as the process of nat-
ural epistemology, mentioned earlier. If the play in this theater is condensed 
into 1.5 hours, eusocial ants appear in it for the entire last minute. By contrast, 
our time in the play is 500 times shorter, only 0.1 second. Within such a short 
time span we made irreversible damage to the ecosystem. In other words, we 
committed an epistemological error which, hopefully, is not irreversible. By 
contrast, ants live in harmony with the ecosystem. Are their superorganisms 
resistant to manipulation by the few, like the honeybee superorganisms?
3.1.3. Tool for Building the Car
The previous section outlined the key biological motive for building the car 
– human eusociality. The next question is: what is the tool for building the 
car? In other words, is there anything within the phenomenon of eusociality 
responsible for generating such a tool? Horkheimer and Adorno suggested, 
without being aware of eusociality, that this tool is technology:
Kings control technology no more directly than do merchants: it is as demo-
cratic as the economic system with which it evolved. Technology is the essence 
of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor images, nor the 
joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labor of others, capital 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002:2).
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Interestingly, Horkheimer and Adorno equated science and technology 
and identified them as a unified tool available to “instrumental reason” in its 
model building.
Power and knowledge are synonymous. For Bacon as for Luther, “knowledge that 
tendeth but to satisfaction, is but as a courtesan, which is for pleasure, and not 
for fruit or generation.” Its concern is not “satisfaction, which men call truth,” 
but “operation,” the effective procedure (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 2).
Francis Bacon is singled out as the inventor of the physicalist scientific 
method. The establishment of the Royal Society in 1660 represented institu-
tionalization of Bacon’s method, which was taken over by the state as its own 
tool. The main concern of this institutionalized tool was not the “truth,” but 
“operation,” the effective procedure.
If we accept that technology is the tool for building the car, the question is 
whether technology constitutes a natural consequence of eusociality. For ex-
ample, Horkheimer and Adorno suggested that the realization of the whole may 
represent the means by which the human superorganism exerts its power. The 
question can be answered by investigating the collective behavior of eusocial 
insects. If indeed, eusocial insects show obligate technological behavior then 
the answer may be affirmative.
Let us use Richard Li-Hua’s concept of technology to start answering the 
question (Li-Hua 2013). His concept is a synthetic attempt to unify all defi-
nitions of human technologies. According to Li-Hua, all human technologies 
have four components: (i) technique, (ii) knowledge, (iii) organization of the 
work process and (iv) the product (Figure 2 A). 
The technique is a group name for instruments (tools and machines), mate-
rials and the way in which instruments and materials are brought into a com-
mon function. The knowledge has forms of applied science, skills and intuition. 
The organization of the work process is the combination of the technique and 
knowledge with the aim of achieving a certain result. The result is recogniz-
able as the fourth component of technology – the product. The product is the 
ultimate result of the association of the previous three factors, the technique, 
the knowledge and the organization of the work process (Figure 2 A).
When the collective behavior of eusocial ants from the genera Atta and Ac-
romyrmex is assessed through the Li-Hua’s technological prism (Figure 1 A), 
all four components of technology are identifiable in the practice of ant agri-
culture (Figure 1 B; Table 2). The source of food for leafcutter ants is the fresh 
green leaf biomass, which their digestive system cannot process. To overcome 
this biological barrier leafcutter ants made a symbiosis with a fungus and thus 
invented their version of agriculture, which is one of the first technologies in 
animals (Table 2, Mueller et al. 2005, Slijepčević 2018b).
The ants bring pieces of fresh leaves to the nest, chew them, and store them 
in gardens on which a fungus is planted. They fertilize gardens with their own 
faeces. The fungus processes all the leafy biomass and turns it into food for 
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the entire colony. The ant agriculture meets the above four requirements of 
technology (Figure 2 B, Table 2, Slijepčević 2018b).
Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that technology may constitute a conse-
quence of eusociality – the division of labour within the superorganism gener-
ates a collective behavior that becomes an ecological force (Slijepčević 2018b). 
Furthermore, it may be argued that food production is an obligate requirement 
for highly eusocial animal collectives (Mueller et al. 2005). The most com-
mon way for collective food production is the practice of agriculture identifi-
able in ants, termites and humans (Mueller et al. 2005). Honeybees produce 
food through a different technological process: chemical modification of the 
ready-made plant material. As a result, there may be two forms of eusociality: 
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machines Materials
Product
• Applied science
• Skills
• Intuition
+ =
• Expertise for leaf cutting
• Expertise for handling seeds 
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• Expertise for curing infections
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Figure 2. A. Synthetic definition of technology according to Richard Li-Hua (Li-Hua 2013). For 
details see the text. B. Analysis of ant agriculture as a form of technology using Li-Hua’s 
definition as a model. (See also Table 2). C. Institutionalized global science as a form of 
technology (modeled on Soete et al. 2015). OWP – Organization of the Work Process.
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ultra-eusociality in which collective food production is obligate (ants, termites, 
honeybees and humans) and ordinary eusociality in which it is not (Gowdy and 
Krall 2016: 181; Slijepčević 2018b: 202).
However, humanity achieved a technological leap beyond agriculture. The 
practice of human agriculture generated an economic surplus (primitive cap-
ital), which transformed the agricultural technology into a global technologi-
cal conquest of nature (modern capital) (Diamond 1991, Mithen 1996, Hawken 
et al. 1999). The cultural framework for the conquest was the institutionaliza-
tion of science and adoption of the scientific method by European states. For 
example, English and French academies of sciences were established in 1660 
and 1666 respectively, under state protectorates. Similar practices were em-
ployed by other European states soon after. The new practice allowed Euro-
pean states to (i) gradually eradicate the populace’s reliance on magic, which 
was widespread in the pre-Enlightenment Europe and (ii) set humanity on the 
course of exploitation of nature via institutionalized science (Ferguson 2012). 
However, DE revealed a weak spot of institutionalized science based on 
physicalism (see sections 3.1.1. and 3.1.2). Furthermore, modern institutional-
ized science, a globalized process according to UNESCO, conforms to Li-Hua’s 
criteria of technology (Figure 2 C, Slijepčević 2018b). The global scientific 
community and its institutions in the form of universities, institutes, and tech-
no-corporations, created and embraced by modern states as the key generator 
of the capital (Hawken et al. 1999; Soethe 2015) represent the global laboratory 
Table 2. Ant agriculture as a form of technology. Sources: Mueller et al. 2005, Wilson 2012, 
Slijepčević 2018b. 
Technique Knowledge OWP Product
The 
technology of 
eusocial ants 
from genera 
Atta and 
Acromyrmex.
Instruments 
(Tools & 
Machines): 
(i) Sharp jaws 
controlled 
by powerful 
muscles. Ant 
jaws represent 
a vibrating 
knife or 
microtome.
(ii) Ant 
bodies act 
as transport 
vehicles. 
The material 
used by ants is 
the green leaf 
mass and the 
fungus.
Instinct-based 
knowledge: 
(i) how to cut 
leaves, (ii) how 
and when 
to transport 
pieces of 
leaves (iii) how 
and when 
to form new 
fungal gardens 
and (iv) how 
and when 
to cure the 
gardens from 
infection.
Leaves are cut, 
transported from 
the cut-off site 
to the nest and 
surrendered to 
other workers. 
Specialist 
workers chew 
the pieces of 
leaves and turn 
them into a 
pulp. The pulp 
is stored in 
fungal gardens, 
fertilized, 
inoculated by 
fungal seeds 
and processed 
through the 
agricultural 
practices.
The product 
is food for 
the ant 
colony. The 
green pulp is 
completely 
processed by 
a symbiotic 
fungus into 
an edible 
product. 
This is an 
obligatory 
process 
(there is no 
eusociality 
without 
agriculture).
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turned-fueling-station for ACM (Table 1, Figure 2 C). This means that institu-
tionalized science as a form of technology employed by global humanity may 
be a consequence of eusociality (Slijepčević 2018b: 222). The problem, accord-
ing to DE, is that humanity has so far been unable to recognize that the prod-
uct of institutionalized science – the conquest of the territory of the unknown 
by physicalist science (Figure 2 C) – is irrational (see below). 
Thus, the key element that links the practice of human eusociality with 
modern capitalism is the propensity of the few (the elite in European states re-
sponsible for the exploitation of physicalist science) to associate an extra value 
with the fourth component of technology, the product (Li-Hua 2013, Moore 
2017, Moore 2018). The product, as the final component of the eusocial tech-
nological process, may be equated with the concept of capital.
3.2. Critique of the Machinocene Concept
Let us start this section with a relevant quote from DE, used earlier. The con-
sequence of “instrumental reason” is that nature is interpreted as an automat-
ed system, or the machine: 
Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has 
itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine. (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 2002: 19)
The phrase aping the machine is a particularly illustrative description of 
“instrumental reason”. It can be interpreted as an attempt of “instrumental 
reason” to force nature to succumb to its rules, which are the rules of science 
based on physicalism. This is in line with the Anthropocene’s principle accord-
ing to which humanity, not nature, is the dominant ecological force on Earth 
(see above). The logical continuation of this type of reasoning is the concept 
of Machinocene – the emergence of the mechanical mind in the form of the 
machine superintelligence constructed by mechanistic science based on phys-
icalism (Price 2016). Some philosophers and scientists argue that the new me-
chanical mind may become autonomous – it may not require the human in-
put after a certain point known as a technological singularity (Bostrom 2014, 
Price 2016). However, the machine autonomy may be an example of flawed 
reasoning in light of arguments from biology outlined earlier (e.g. Rosen 1991, 
Elsasser 1998) but also new arguments, which will be outlined below.
A school of theoretical biology, known as relational biology, offers a power-
ful challenge to the concept of instrumental reason and the Machinocene con-
cept, in particular, their mechanistic bases, which are insufficient to fully un-
derstand complex systems such as organisms, ecosystems and the biosphere as 
a whole. If the organizational principles of the biosphere, including the concept 
of natural mind in the sense used by Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1979, Bateson 
2000), cannot be fully grasped by the mechanistic science, it seems likely that 
the anticipated machine’s mind dominance over nature– the Machinocene – 
may be a case of gross misunderstanding, or Batesonian epistemological error. 
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Nevertheless, this misunderstanding is a perfect opportunity for mechanistic 
science to expand the practice of “instrumental reason”. The words of the found-
er of cybernetics, Norbert Weiner, sound prophetic and in unison with ACM:
Let us remember that the automatic machine…is the precise economic equiva-
lent of slave labor. Any labor which competes with slave labor must accept the 
economic conditions of slave labor. (Weinner 1989: 162)
The founder of relational biology was a theoretical physicist Nicolas Ra-
shevsky. The school’s most influential proponent was Robert Rosen, who es-
tablished philosophical and mathematical foundations of relational biology. 
Even though Rosen has not mentioned DE in his writings, he identified a ver-
sion of “instrumental reason”: he thought that the mechanistic foundation of 
science is irrational (Kineman 2007). Here are two relevant quotes from Ros-
en’s book Life Itself which sum up his stance towards the mechanistic under-
standing of living systems:
The question “What is life?” is not often asked in biology, precisely because 
the machine metaphor already answers it: “Life is a machine.” (Rosen 1991: 23)
It may perhaps be true that the question “What is life?” is hard because we do 
not yet know enough. But it is at least equally possible that we simply do not 
properly understand what we already know. (Rosen 1991: 17)
Let us briefly outline Rosen’s understanding of the differences between 
the organism and the machine. This will bring Rosen’s thought in line with 
the DE argumentation and provide a powerful refutation of the Machinocene 
concept. Rosen postulated that all living systems are anticipatory systems. He 
defined the anticipatory system as a natural system that contains an internal 
predictive model of itself and of its environment. The predictive model allows 
the system to change the state at an instant in line with the model’s prediction.
An outline of the anticipatory system is shown in Figure 3. Every organism 
from a bacterium to an elephant must contain information about self, about 
species and about the environment, encoded into the organization of the living 
system. This information acts causally on the present behavior of the organism 
based on the modeling relations projected to be applicable in the future (Fig-
ure 3). The relationship is primarily epistemological. In the natural epistemo-
logical process organisms or Natural Systems (NS) generate internal models of 
themselves called Formal Systems (FS). The links between NS and FS is one of 
the epistemological-ontological unity in which the natural “glue” holding the re-
lationship together is natural information (for details see the legend for Figure 3). 
Thus, the behavior of Rosen’s anticipatory systems at any present instant 
involves aspects of past, present, and future, because the internal model serves 
to pull the future into the present. By contrast, physicalist science admits only 
Reactive systems – those systems that react in the present to changes that have 
already occurred in the causal chain. Rosen’s “Zeroth Commandment” is a 
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critique of the dogmatism of mechanistic science, which obeys the so-called 
objective causality:
Thou shalt not allow future state to affect present change of state. (Rosen 1991: 49).
One of the postulates of mechanistic science is that the true objective cau-
sality cannot argue from final causes. By contrast, living organisms (Figure 3 A) 
are capable of constructing an internal surrogate of time as part of the model-
ing relations (Rosen 1985) that eventually produce anticipation. 
Using the mathematical category theory, which allows mapping of relations 
between NS and FS (Figure 3) Rosen identified a key difference between the 
organism and the machine. The machine is not capable of constructing the 
closed causal loop, whereas every organism, from a bacterium to an elephant, 
is (Rosen 1991: 241). This roughly means that machines cannot have autono-
my as they are not constructed through the principles of self-organization or 
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Figure 3. A. The relationship between the natural entity or NS (Natural System – any 
organism from a bacterium to an elephant) and knowledge of it or FS (Formal System – a 
species-specific information processing system). Mapping in the model, which is category-
theoretic mapping (based on mathematical category theory), is informational in nature. 
Information, as a process of encoding and decoding, is a “glue” holding NSs and their 
environments together. “Encoding” or abstraction is a set of qualities or quantities 
(epistemological and ontological) from a NS for use in the FS or a model. Senses employed 
in a species-specific manner are equated with natural abstractions. Such abstractions 
reflect what is usually meant by the term biological “structure” (see panel B). On the other 
hand, “decoding” (in the epistemological and ontological sense) is best described by 
Bateson’s notion of information as “a difference that makes a difference” or “patterns that 
connect” (Bateson 1979). In other words, “decoding” is associated with the concept of 
biological “function” as shown in panel B. Thus, structure and function are emergent 
properties of the modeling relationship “representing the empirical world emerging from 
the ontological”. Adapted from Rosen (1991) and Kineman et al. (2007). 
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autopoiesis – a process behind the construction of organisms or anticipato-
ry systems, which effectively closes causal loops (Maturana and Varela 1998, 
Capra 1996). The machine thus remains an automaton lacking the capacity of 
anticipation and entirely dependent on its creator. 
Therefore, if there is no closed causal loop in the machine, as Rosen’s work 
based on the category theory suggests, then the concept of Machinocene– an 
autonomous mechanical mind – may be invalid. Even though Rosen’s theo-
ries have been criticized by proponents of the mechanistic world-view, the 
way for refuting the criticism may be in integrating Rosen’s theories with the 
principles of autopoiesis of Maturana and Varela (Maturana and Varela 1998), 
Bateson’s version of natural mind (Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000) and principles 
of EE (Slijepcevic 2018a). 
3.3. Refining the Concept of Capitalocene
As stated earlier, the Capitalocene concept shares significant similarities with 
the DE style of argumentation. Therefore, what follows cannot be called a 
critique of the Capitalocene concept, but rather an attempt to refine certain 
points within its structure.
Similarly to Horkheimer and Adorno, who identified technology as the key 
force behind generation of the capital (see above), Jason W. Moore (Moore 2017; 
2018) argued that the notion of technics, as used by Lewis Mumford (Mumford 
1934: 26), allowed integration of tools and knowledge in a new world praxis 
– capitalism – capable of opening the doors of nature in the search for cheap 
capital. The key point, according to Moore, is that humanity is an integral part 
of nature: “humanity-in-nature” or humanity in the web of life. The phrase 
“web of life” is attributed to Chief Seattle:
Man did not weave the web of life;
He is merely a strand in it.
Whatever he does to the web,
He does to himself.3
Thus, capitalism silently becomes a way of organizing nature through the 
technological activity of one of its numerous strands: man. The hierarchical 
organization of human superorganisms, or states, allows implementation of 
the practice of “instrumental reason” through the imposition of concepts in-
vented by the few, on the entire collective (see above). The collective becomes 
a slave executor of the will of the inventors.
This line of reasoning is in contrast with the reasoning of the Anthropocene 
concept which is Cartesian: there is an artificial split between humanity and 
nature. Humanity acts as an artificial external force, which interprets the web 
of life as a passive foreign territory open to a massive conquest. The identity 
3  Adapted by Ted Perry.
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of true instigators is hidden and deliberately masked through the practice of 
“instrumental reason” – subduing the collective by the few (see above). 
Lewis Mumford argued that non-European civilizations (Chinese, Greek, 
Arab etc.) differed from their European counterpart in one important respect. 
Non-European civilizations were technological civilizations but did not inter-
pret nature as a source of cheap capital. As Mumford commented: They had 
machines but they did not develop “the machine”. In other words, only the Eu-
ropean civilization followed the mechanistic path of Newtonian science based 
on physicalism. Similarly to Horkheimer and Adorno, who singled out Francis 
Bacon as the founder of this path, Moore’s colleague Justin McBrein (McBrein 
2017: 125) used the general concept of the scientist as “a gunslinger in a side-
real wild west, an imperialist fantasy that would overcome the contradictions 
of capitalist surplus extraction.”
Thus, the Capitalocence concept and DE singled out the European civili-
zation as the founder of capitalism and modernity that is affected by irratio-
nalism. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the irrationalism was caused by the En-
lightenment’s fear of the unknown, which turned a perfectly rational ambition 
to expand knowledge into an irrational obsession to over-know by taking the 
map for the territory (Table 1). For Moore, irrationalism is the abstraction of 
man and its replacement by a new artificial species: the capital or the fourth 
component of the natural technological process – the product (Figure 2). This 
new species can be interpreted as collective humanity in its mechanicist vehi-
cle with no brakes fueled by the physicalist science (ACM). As Justin Mc’Brien 
(Mc’Brien 2017: 116) put it:
Capital is the Sixth Extinction personified: it feasts on the dead, and in doing 
so, devours all life. The deep time of past cataclysm becomes the deep time of 
future catastrophe; the residue of life in hydrocarbons becomes the residue of 
capital in petrochemical plastics. Capitalism leaves in its wake the disappearance 
of species, languages, cultures, and peoples. It seeks the planned obsolescence 
of all life. Extinction lies at the heart of capitalist accumulation.
Here is an outline of developments in biology, which support Moore’s con-
cept of “humanity in the web of life”. Humanity is just one of 9 million species 
estimated to inhabit the planet (Mora et al. 2011). All our activities, including 
the socio-economic organization, are formatted by our experiences of being 
a part of the natural collective from which we emerged in the process of evo-
lution. There is nothing special about us in a biological sense. For example, if 
the biological success is measured by the contribution to the biomass of the 
entire biosphere, then the most successful organisms are plants. Their biomass 
exceeds the animal biomass 1,000 times. As one botanist commented we only 
exist in traces compared to plants (Mancuso and Viola 2015).
Furthermore, we are not special even in the phenomena of technology, as 
mechanistic science would like us to believe. The inventors of technology among 
animals are insects (Mueller et al. 2005, Slijepčević 2018b). The first evolution-
ary form of technology was insect agriculture (Figure 2 B). Our techno-science 
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is nothing more than an evolutionary derivative (Diamond 1991). Even modern 
human technologies such as the Internet and future technologies such as the 
Internet of Things may have equivalents in bacteria which we do not usually 
take as intelligent (Margulis and Sagan 1997, Slijepcevic 2017). There is a large 
body of specialist literature supporting the notion of animal technical intel-
ligence (summarized in Schumaker et al. 2011). Therefore, Moore’s argument 
of humanity being an integral part of the web of life, not only in the material 
sense but also in the functional sense, which eventually generates a form eu-
social practice we call capitalism, is correct.
Given the destructive potential of Capitalocene and its deadly effects on 
the biosphere in the form of biological annihilation (Ceballos et al. 2017), also 
dubbed the Necrocene (McBrien 2017: 116), an important question is why only 
the European civilization invented capitalism even though other civilizations 
had basic technological means at their disposal to develop it long before Eu-
ropeans. This is the question that begs a comprehensive analysis. Horkheimer 
and Adorno provided a clue: propensity to over-know or degeneration of En-
lightenment. The consequence of this propensity is the ACM model imposed 
on the entire humanity as a result of the irrational ambition of the few to le-
gitimize potential for self-destruction (Table 1).
4. How to Counter “Instrumental Reason”
There are three avenues that can be explored to reduce the negative effects 
of “instrumental reason” or even to fully eliminate it. First, given that science 
based on physicalism most likely interprets nature in a wrong way – a me-
chanical system or the machine, which can be fully understood by physicalist 
science – a reform of foundations of science may reverse this epistemological 
error. Many scientists and philosophers argued that the biosphere is a cogni-
tive system with the epistemological-ontological unity (Lovelock and Margu-
lis, 1974, Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000, Capra 1997, Maturana and Varela 1998, 
Nicholson and Dupre 2018). The biosphere is not an organism, but a super-sys-
tem composed of organisms so that organisms form epistemological-ontologi-
cal unities with their environments consisting of different kinds of organisms. 
This holarchy4 of systems must be explored by a form of science that should 
suspend the primacy of physicalism, at least temporarily, to allow biology to 
take the lead. Anticipatory systems (Rosen 1985, Rosen 1991), mind and nature 
(Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000, Capra 1997, Maturana and Varela 1998), holar-
chy (Koestler 1981), symbiogenesis (Sagan 1967, Margulis 1970), nature of bi-
ological intelligence (Slijepcevic 2018a), processual biology (Nicholson and 
Dupre 2018) and a range of other questions in biology must be explored from 
the new perspective which should confirm, or not, the validity of physicalism. 
Philosophically, this is a sound approach. The foundation of science is not a 
given. There is no reason as to why the foundations of physicalism cannot be 
4  The term used by Arthur Koestler related to his concept of the holon. 
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challenged by right arguments. One of the components of physicalism ripe for 
criticism is reductionism. As Karl Popper (Popper 1982: 171) argued: “None of 
these reductionist efforts explain the creativity of the universe: life, and its in-
credible intricacies and wealth of forms.”
Second, a greater emphasis on investigating natural phenomena such as euso-
ciality and technology would allow identifying elements in our ultra-eusociality, 
which predispose us to the practice of “instrumental reason”. By the same token, 
identifying elements of ultra-eusociality in insects, which make them resistant 
to the development of “instrumental reason”, as a form of natural epistemolo-
gy, would be useful. For example, ants could be a good role model for humanity 
in the search for breaks on the collective car (Slijepčević 2018b). Their biomass 
is roughly equivalent to the human biomass (Wilson 2012). Yet, ants live in the 
ecological harmony with the planetary ecosystem. By contrast, the Capitalocene 
may have already altered the ecological balance of the biosphere irreversibly. 
One of the most pressing questions is why only the European civilization 
invented capitalism as the world ecology. Earlier civilizations, Arab, Chinese, 
Greek, and others, had technological means at their disposal and yet they did 
not move in the direction of technology dominated by science. Jared Diamond 
argued that the pre-agricultural humanity was the only form of human super-
organism in harmony with nature (Diamond 1991).
Finally, the third avenue is the appreciation of the aesthetics of nature as 
argued by Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1979: 18):
Observe, however, that there have been, and still are, in the world many differ-
ent and even contrasting epistemologies which been alike in stressing an ulti-
mate unity and, although this is less sure, which have also stressed the notion 
that ultimate unity is aesthetic. The uniformity of these views gives hope that 
perhaps the great authority of quantitative science may be insufficient to deny 
an ultimate unifying beauty.
Bateson’s view parallels views of Elsasser (Elsasser 1998: 4), who thought 
that biology must take account of the creativity of nature. Nature’s creative 
act is ultimately aesthetic. This is in line with the concept of biophilia (Wil-
son 1984), the love for living organisms, as the powerful contrasts for the no-
tion of mechanophilia (Slijepčević 2018b: 273), or love for the machine, which 
typifies the modern world. 
5. Concluding Remarks
In this study, I attempted to expose the three 21st century concepts to the ar-
guments from DE constructed roughly 60 years earlier in a different histori-
cal background, that of the biggest destruction in human history in the form 
of two world wars and the creation of nuclear weapons as the means for mass 
destruction. In the post-rationalist world of modernity (Elsasser 1998), the 
capitalism as the world ecology (Moore 2017; Moore 2018), or ACM in my in-
terpretation (Table 1), become the new means for mass destruction in the form 
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of biological annihilation (Ceballos 2017). Thus, the peak of “instrumental rea-
son” is the irrational attempt to legitimize self-destruction.
The inevitable conclusion is that DE arguments did not lose any of their 
philosophical and sociological appeals. It can be argued that DE can help us 
refine the analysis of modernity by integrating its own style of argumentation 
with the thoughts of scientists critical of the dominant scientific world-view 
(Bateson 1979; Elassser 1998, Rosen 1991) rooted in the physicalist science. 
This new framework requires a deep analysis of human eusociality in light of 
“humanity-in-nature” and “nature-in-humanity” (Moore 2017, Moore 2018).
Some philosophers and scientists think that the emergence of an autono-
mous machine superintelligence may constitute a qualitatively new phenom-
enon never experienced before in the human existence and in the existence of 
the biosphere (Bostrom 2014; Price 2016). This is a bold assumption, which may 
not be entirely justifiable given the criticism of mechanistic science outlined 
above. Therefore, there is a pressing need to discuss the concept of “instrumen-
tal reason” in a truly democratic fashion and assess its future risks. To para-
phrase Robert Rosen, we cannot rely on yesterday armies to fight future wars.
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Antropocen, kapitalocen, mašinocen: iluzije instrumentalnog razuma
Apstrakt
U svom uticajnom delu Dijalektika prosvetiteljstva, Horkhajmer i Adorno su tumačili kapitali-
zam kao iracionalnu monetarizaciju prirode. U ovom radu analiziramo tri dvadesetprvovekov-
na koncepta, antropocen, kapitalocen i mašinocen u svetlu Horkhajmerovih i Adornovih ar-
gumenata i skorašnjih argumenata iz filozofije biologije. Analiza otkriva izvandredno prisustvo 
pojma “instrumentalnog razuma” koji je pristuan u sva tri koncepta na duboko zagonetan 
način. Naša interpretacija je da pojam opisuje sklonost nauke zasnovane, na shvatanjima fi-
zikalizma, da tumači prirodu kao mašinu podložnu analiziranju i programiranju od strane ljud-
skog uma. Rezultat toga je da je koncept antropocena izgrađen oko mehanicističkog modela, 
koji može biti predstavljen metaforom automobila bez kočnica. Na sličan način koncept ma-
šinocena predviđa nastanak mehaničkog uma koji će dominirati nad prirodom u skoroj bu-
dućnosti. Konačno, koncept kapitalocena pretvara savršeno racionalnu ambiciju za širenjem 
znanja u iracionalnu opsesiju prekomernim znanjem putem institucionalizovane nauke kao 
motora kapitalizma bez kočnica. Zajednički sadržalac sva tri koncepta je iracionalna sklonost 
za legitimacijom samouništenja. Potencijalne mogućnosti za suprotstavljanje efektima “in-
strumentalnog razuma” su predložene.
Ključne reči: instrumentalni razum, antropocen, mašinocen, kapitalocen 
